University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 10

May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM

Commentary on: J. Anthony Blair's "Are conductive arguments
really not possible?"
Yun Xie
Sun Yat-sen University, Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosohy

Min Ghui Xiong
Sun Yat-sen University, Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Xie, Yun and Xiong, Min Ghui, "Commentary on: J. Anthony Blair's "Are conductive arguments really not
possible?"" (2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 25.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/25

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Commentary on: J. Anthony Blair’s “Are conductive arguments
really not possible?”
YUN XIE
Institute of Logic and Cognition
Department of philosophy
Sun Yat-sen University
Guangzhou, China
xierobert2005@gmail.com

MINGHUI XIONG
Institute of Logic and Cognition
Department of philosophy
Sun Yat-sen University
Guangzhou, China
hssxmh@mail.sysu.edu.cn

1. INTRODUCTION
Recently the topic of conductive argument has attracted more and more attention
from argumentation scholars. Based on a careful reading, and some critical
development, of Carl Wellman’s ideas of “conduction” and “conductive”, many
scholars are apt to take conductive argument as a new and important type of
argument. The best example, also the representative pattern, of Conductive
Argument is an argument whose conclusion is drawn non-conclusively from both
positive and negative considerations. This is a distinctive type of argument,
according to many of its advocates, because there is no other type of argument
which explicitly takes into account the negative considerations, and thereby
indicates that the conclusion is reached in a way of weighing and balancing.
However, this promising view of conductive argument has been challenged
by Jonathan Adler, in his last paper on the journal of Argumentation. From an
epistemological point of view, Adler seriously doubts that we could really have the
conductive argument understood in the above way. His arguments in that paper are
now critically examined by J. Anthony Blair, who tries to reveal that Adler’s criticism
is based on some misunderstanding of conductive argument.
2. ARGUING ABOUT CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENT
Adler agrees that many of our public issues are indeed controversial, or unsettled at
the present time, so they have “the evident pro-con nature” (Alder, 2013, p.4), that is,
when we think about them, and when we try to argue for some view on these issues,
we do need to consider both reasons for and reasons against our claim. Therefore,
“Conductive Arguments are not new; what is new is their recognition, their critical
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-6.
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examination, and the discussions of explicit roles they are called to play” (ibid.).
However, he disagrees with most of advocates of conductive argument, on their
ways of defining this type of argument. Because he believes that they have wrongly
characterized conductive argument with two incompatible properties:
(1)
the argument itself is inconclusive, since the counterconsiderations are regarded as being able to continue to diminish the
support for the conclusion;
and
(2)
the conclusion of the argument is supposed to be accepted as
true or acceptable without qualification, thus it could issue in belief.
Adler contends that these two characterizations are indeed conflicting, since
if the conclusion is to be accepted as true or acceptable, then the undermining
reasons must not remain viable.
From an epistemological point of view, Adler argues that only conclusive
arguments whose premises provide sufficient support can render their conclusions
acceptable without qualification, and then yield our belief in conclusion in such a
way that we could “separate the accepted conclusion from the premises that settled
its truth”. (Alder, 2013, p.5) He terms this phenomenon detachment, or entitlement
to detach, which “reflects that inquiry on the matter is ended - all relevant
considerations are weighed in”. (ibid.) Detachment, according to Adler, is not
possible for all the inconclusive arguments, whose conclusions have to be reached
with qualification, for there still remain relevant evidences to be accommodated.
As a result, conductive argument cannot have both of the above properties: if
it is inconclusive, it must have its conclusion qualified; or, if it renders conclusion
acceptable and issues belief, it has to be conclusive, by nullifying all the counterconsiderations. Characterizing conductive argument with those two properties at
the same time would just make the understanding of conductive argument
paradoxical, and its existence impossible.
Blair assessed Adler’s analysis and he disagrees. As his first criticism, Blair
points out that Adler has misunderstood the views of (most of) the proponents of
conductive arguments, especially, their ways of unpacking the meaning of
inconclusive. According to Blair, Alder has wrongly taken it to mean that conductive
arguments “are non-conclusive in the sense that their conclusions are not detached
from their premises, but always remain qualified by the acknowledged counterconsiderations”. (Blair, 2013, p.6) While, unfortunately, a careful reading of the
works of Wellman, Govier, and other proponents of conductive argument will just
prove this surmise to be simply false. As Blair has shown,
for Wellman, conductive reasoning and arguments are inconclusive in the sense that
they are not subject to deductive closure (Blair, 2013, p. 5)
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for Govier, the premises of conductive arguments do not supply conclusive support
for their conclusions in the sense that those premises do not entail those
conclusions. (ibid.)

and

conductive arguments are non-conclusive, for Pinto, just in the respect that they are
defeasible and in that respect they are unlike deductively valid arguments. (Blair,
2013, p. 6)

Therefore, Blair contends, “Adler simply mistakes what those theorists mean
by ‘non-conclusive.’ There seems, on close examination, to be no incompatibility
between Adler’s position and that of the proponents of conductive arguments.”
(ibid.)
For his second criticism, Blair carefully examines many other views of the
authors of chapters in Conductive Argument, the book Adler cited in writing his
paper. His finding is that almost no one has held the view that the conclusion of
conductive argument is non-detachable (James Freeman, arguably, might be the
only exception). So they are “not committed, by virtue of Adler’s argument, to the
view that conductive arguments are not possible” (Blair, 2013, p. 9). It appears as
though Adler himself is committing a straw man fallacy, refuting a seemingly
inconsistent view that no one really has. As his final verdict, Blair concludes,
[Adler’s] objection to the possibility of conclusion-detached conductive arguments
when these are defined as, among other things, non-conclusive, is based on a
misunderstanding of the way ‘non-conclusive’ is used by many, if not most, of the
proponents of conductive reasoning and argument. So conductive arguments are,
after all, possible - at least if Adler has identified the only reason for thinking that
they are not.(Blair, 2013, p. 9)

3. ADLER’S OBJECTION AGAIN
Does Blair make a good case against Adler’s objections on conductive argument? We
believe he does. Alder detects two incompatible properties (i.e. being inconclusive
and establishing the truth/acceptance of conclusion) which are supposed to be
characteristic of conductive argument. But, as Blair has pointed out in such a clear
way with solid evidence, since no one really understands one of them (inconclusive)
in the way Adler has in mind, the incompatibility turns out to be illusive.
However, is Adler’s critique then to be completely dismissed? Is there really
nothing incompatible in current understanding of conductive argument that would
turn the impossibility of its existence? We think the answer remains to be vague.
Adler could have formulated his arguments in a better way, to avoid the
using of and the interpreting of the term inconclusive, which result his being guilty of
misunderstanding. He is attracted by the frequent uses of “inconclusive” by others.
And he hastily assumes it to be “a term for expressing the conviction that in
Conductive Arguments there are un-eliminated or unreduced, even if outweighed,
counter-considerations” (Alder, 2013, p.7), while unluckily all the others in fact take
it to mean “non-deductive” or “defeasible”.
Regardless of the fact that Adler does misunderstand the others’ uses and
meanings of inconclusive, let’s try to think the issue in another way around: whether
3
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the others have indeed attributed conductive arguments with a characterization
that Alder has referred to by his wrong use of the term inconclusive? We believe they
have, since for almost all of them, counter-considerations, though outweighed, are
still seen to be remaining viable, and are treated as premises providing reasons
relevant to the strength of argument. It is nearly the same as the property that Adler
has attributed to conductive arguments with “inconclusive”. It, as Blair himself has
identified, consists in “their counter-considerations continuing to carry force and to
weaken the argument even after the conclusion has been drawn”. (Blair, 2013, p.2)
Consequently, the incompatibility that Adler has detected might still be there in
their ways of characterizing conductive argument.
As Adler has clarified, “the claim that I dispute is that once the conclusion is
drawn, the counter-considerations continue to diminish its support” (Adler, 2013, p.
4), and his “main and final conclusion” is “that counter-considerations must be
nullified if there is to be acceptance of the conclusion.” (ibid. p. 7) To argue for these
claims, he explains at length the mechanism of detachment, and he strives to defend
that if the conclusion of conductive argument could be rendered acceptable or
accepted to be true (i.e. detachable), the counter-considerations must have already
been nullified. As Blair’s survey of views in Conductive Argument has confirmed to
us, nearly everyone has held the view that the conclusion of conductive argument is
detachable while none of the outweighed counter-considerations needs to be
nullified. So here comes the incompatibility that Adler really has in mind, which has
nothing to do with the different meaning and uses of the term inconclusive.
Accordingly, another version of Adler’s argument against conductive
argument, in our reading, runs as follows:
1.
When our argument is cogent, meeting whatever conditions are necessary
for a successful argument, the claim in conclusion can be reasonably accepted, and
then yield belief in the claim legitimately.
2.
Within a cogent argument, we can separate the accepted conclusion from the
premises that settled its truth, which represents an end of inquiry (till now) into
whether the claim in conclusion holds or not.
3.
An inquiry on some matter could be ended only when all relevant
considerations (available at the present time) have been weighed in.
4.
When all the relevant considerations have been weighed in, a definite view
could be reached and asserted, which means, and requires, that the reasons in
favour of it have been considered to be sufficiently strong to outweigh the reasons
against it, otherwise the inquiry on the matter remains to be open and no definite
view can be asserted without qualification.
5.
When reasons against a claim are outweighed, their function and role in the
inquiry of the claim are then nullified; as a result, they are no longer of (negative)
consequence, and become irrelevant, in the establishment of that claim. Why?
Because
4
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when one belief is settled favourable by the evidence, the disfavoured belief
evaporates, since it has been determined to be false….the favouring of one belief
over a conflicting one can only occur if the counter-considerations, the reasons in
favour of the conflicting beliefs, are nullified. Previously conflicting reasons must
lose force. (Adler, 2013, p.10)

6.
It is incompatible, in our inquiry, to reach or assert a definite claim without
qualification, while at the same time to retain the force and relevance of reasons
which have already been outweighed.
7.
A conductive argument, as characterized by many of its proponents, just
embodies this incompatibility: the conclusion is supposed to be established (as
acceptable) without qualification, while the outweighed counter-considerations are
still regarded to be retaining their force and relevance in establishing the conclusion.
This argument could still be challenged, especially for some of its premises
which simply involve controversies in the field of epistemology. But that is not our
concern here, though we would like to see how the proponents of conductive
argument would respond.
4. WHY ARGUE CONDUCTIVELY?
There are some more points in Adler’s objections which we find very interesting,
and would like to expand a little.
Conductive argument (of its third pattern) is regarded as a distinctive type,
because there is no other type of argument which explicitly collects both affirmative
and negative reasons bearing on the conclusion into a single structure, and thereby
indicates that the conclusion is reached in a way of weighing and balancing. It seems
to be very common in our argumentative practices, for in many occasions and on
many issues, together with providing reasons supporting our conclusion, we do
explicitly mention or acknowledge those reasons against it. It is particularly
indicated by linguistic clues such as “although,” “even though,” “notwithstanding,”
and “nevertheless”.
However, Alder’s objections are addressed to this distinctiveness of
conductive argument: weighing and balancing. Can we argue for a definite or certain
conclusion, while at the same time are still inquiring on whether it is definite or
certain, i.e. are still in the process of weighing and balancing reasons for and against
it? It appears as though there is some sort of incompatibility within conductive
argument. The conclusions of an argument are always definite and certain, at least
in the arguer’s mind before he/she starts to construct his/her argument, otherwise
it is not arguing, for there is nothing to be argued. Maybe in that case we are only
thinking about or reflecting on the matter, hence conductive arguments are not
arguments at all.
If conductive argument cannot be characterized as representing a process of
weighing and balancing, it could be characterized as representing the product of
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weighing and balancing. That is, the conclusion argued in conductive argument is a
definite or certain one, and characteristically, it is a weighed and balanced
conclusion. The conclusion is the result of an ended inquiry on the matter, and the
argument is a retrospective reconstruction of the finished process of weighing and
balancing. But, Alder wants to inform us, the ending of a process of weighing and
balancing not only terminates inquiry and reaches a certain view, it also settles the
support for the view in a fixed maximal amount, and nullifies the force and
relevance of all the counter-considerations on altering the amount of support.
Therefore, again there seems to be some sort of incompatibility within conductive
argument. The outweighed counter-considerations can no longer be used as reasons
against the conclusion, if the conclusion has already been a weighed and balanced
conclusion, because their force and relevance have already been counted in and
overridden before the argument is made.
It is a matter of fact that outweighed counter-considerations are frequently
used in argumentative practices, especially in the alleged conductive argument (of
its third pattern). What is their role and function? Adler clearly denies that they are
used as reasons against the conclusion, and he furthers backed his view by
contending that their uses are indeed for rhetorical concerns, indicating or
manifesting that “the arguer is not subject to familiar biases like one-sidedness”
(Adler, 2013, p.3). However, proponents of conductive arguments insist that their
uses are for logical concerns; they function as negative reasons, premises,
qualification……and the analysis and evaluation of the strength of conductive
argument have to take them into consideration. How can we decide who is right
about this? We think the judgment can only be made after a careful examination of
the pragmatics of linguistic expressions like “although…”, “even though…”,
“notwithstanding…”, and “nevertheless…”, revealing the real communicative
intentions of our uses of these terms.
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